Guymon

… weder ein realisierbares Ziel noch wünschenswert

“Die automatische Identifikation von Terroristen durch Data Mining (oder andere bekannte Methoden) ist weder ein realisierbares Ziel noch wünschenswert” (…) “Selbst in gut gemanagten Programmen ist es wahrscheinlich, dass signifikante Raten von falsch-positiven Alarmen auftreten, besonders, wenn die Programme hochgradig automatisiert sind”

Zu diesem Ergebnis kommt eine vom Department of Homeland Security (DHS) finanzierte Studie des amerikanischen National Research Council.

Die Studie landet bestimmt in irgendeiner Schublade unter einem Berg anderer Dinge die auch ignoriert werden.

via Virtuelles Datenschutzbüro

Elektrische Geräte besser zu Hause lassen

Das US-Heimatschutzministerium bestätigte nun offiziell, was bereits seit längerer Zeit von Betroffenen und Bürgerrechtsgruppen berichtet wurde: US-Bundesbeamte dürfen bei Zollkontrollen die Daten auf Notebooks und anderen elektronischen Geräten wie etwa MP3-Playern oder Mobiltelefonen und Datenträgern bis hin zu Audiokassetten oder Notizblöcken durchsuchen.

Darüber hinaus dürfen auch Kopien der darauf befindlichen Inhalte angefertigt werden. Sogar die Weitergabe an Unternehmen aus der Privatwirtschaft ist erlaubt.

via heise

Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse der Homeland Security

John Mueller von der Ohio State University/USA untersucht (pdf 104kb) Homeland Security von einem Kosten/Nutzen Standpunkt.

Seine Prämissen:

1. The number of potential terrorist targets is essentially infinite
2. The probability that any individual target will be attacked is essentially zero
3. If one potential target happens to enjoy a degree of protection, the agile terrorist usually can readily move on to another one
4. Most targets are “vulnerable” in that it is not very difficult to damage them, but invulnerable in that they can be rebuilt in fairly short order and at tolerable expense
5. It is essentially impossible to make a very wide variety of potential terrorist targets invulnerable except by completely closing them down

Erinnert stark an die Position von Bruce Schneier.

Improve Air Security

Man denkt ja gerne mal dass ist der kranke Scheiss nicht mehr zu toppen wäre - und irrt sich regelmäßig:

A senior government official with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has expressed great interest in a so-called safety bracelet that would serve as a stun device, similar to that of a police Taser®. According to this promotional video found at the Lamperd Less Lethal, Inc. website, the bracelet would be worn by all airline passengers (video also shown below).

This bracelet would:

• Take the place of an airline boarding pass
• Contain personal information about the traveler
• Be able to monitor the whereabouts of each passenger and his/her luggage
• Shock the wearer on command, completely immobilizing him/her for several minutes

Und das ist wohl - leider - kein Witz.

gefunden bei surveillance-studies

Giuliani über Homeland Security

Passend zum vorherigen Beitrag: Rudolph W. Giuliani philosofiert in The Resilient Society über Homeland Security.

We need to build on the Bush administration’s efforts, such as the USA Patriot Act, to break down the barriers among federal agencies and between foreign and domestic intelligence. The Patriot Act removed barriers to information sharing between the intelligence community and law enforcement, but there is still more to do. We must guard against the danger that the newly created Office of the Director of National Intelligence will become just another layer of bureaucracy that impedes the information flow rather than facilitates it. And we need to pay close attention to unsettling lower-court decisions that raise the specter of the wall’s reemergence, and to the weakening of the Patriot Act by judicial fiat.

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, enacted in 1978 to exclude eavesdropping on foreign communications from judicial oversight, must be modernized and expanded to encompass not just phones, as the current law does, but also newer technologies, such as the fax machine and the Internet. Antiquated laws — enacted when such technologies weren’t part of everyday life — cannot be allowed to hamstring our federal law enforcement and foreign intelligence services. Some members of Congress want to throw as many legal obstacles as possible in front of FBI agents and intelligence officers as they try to intercept communications between known al-Qaida leaders and U.S.-based operatives who will carry out attacks. This is the last thing we should do.